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BECAUSE DEATH IS DIFFERENT: LEGAL
AND MORAL ARGUMENTS FOR
BROADENING DEFENDANTS' RIGHTS TO
DISCOVERY IN FEDERAL CAPITAL CASES
Capital punishment has existed in America since this nation
was founded,2 yet there are few other legal issues that inspire
such passionate debate among scholars' and among the adminis-
trators of justice Arguments on both sides of the line rest in
' See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-04 (1976) ("[D]eath is a
punishment different from all other sanctions in kind rather than degree.")
(citations omitted); HUGO ADAM BEDAU, DEATH IS DIFFERENT: STUDIES IN THE
MORALITY, LAW, AND POLITICS OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1987); BARRY NAKELL &
KENNETH A. HARDY, THE ARBITRARINESS OF THE DEATH PENALTY 30 (1987)
[hereinafter "ARBITRARINESS"] (explaining the " 'death is different' doctrine" of
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), as "the proposition that the death penalty
cannot constitutionally be adminitered in a manner that might be acceptable for
sentences to prison, probation, and fines") (footnote omitted).
2 See Furman, 408 U.S. at 242-43, for a discussion of the influence of the Eng-
lish Bill of Rights of 1689 on capital punishment in colonial America.
'See FRANK G. CARRINGTON, NEITHER CRUEL NOR UNUSUAL 19 (1978) ("As far
back as 1792, one Benjamin Rush, an energetic and apparently influential Philadel-
phia physician, took it upon himself to call for an end to capital punishment because
a sentence of life imprisonment held out the possibility of rehabilitation of the
criminal.") (footnote omitted); see also ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG (PRO) & JOHN P.
CONRAD (CON), THE DEATH PENALTY: A DEBATE (1983).
4 For an example of the vehement disagreement between Supreme Court jus-
tices, see Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141 (1994) (denying certiorari). Justice
Blackmun dissented from the denial of certiorari and announced that he had come
to believe that the death penalty could not be administered in a manner consistent
with the United States Constitution. See id. at 1157 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); i&
at 1145 ("From this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of
death."). Justice Blackmun began with a description of the petitioner's impending
execution:
On February 23, 1994, at approximately 1:00 a.m., Bruce Edwin Callins
will be executed by the State of Texas. Intravenous tubes attached to his
arms will carry the instrument of death, a toxic fluid designed specifically
for the purpose of killing human beings. The witnesses, standing a few feet
away, will behold Callins, no longer a defendant, an appellant, or a peti-
tioner, but a man, strapped to a gurney, and seconds away from extinction.
I&. at 1143 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In response to Justice Blackmun's dissent,
Justice Scalia authored a concurrence with the denial:
JUSTICE BLACKM UN begins his statement by describing with poignancy the
death of a convicted murderer by lethal injection. He chooses, as the case
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religion,' ethics,' legal principles,' and sheer emotion." But rea-
in which to make that statement, one of the less brutal of the murders that
regularly come before us-the murder of a man ripped by a bullet suddenly
and unexpectedly, with no opportunity to prepare himself and his affairs,
and left to bleed to death on the floor of a tavern. The death-by-injection
which JUSTICE BLACKMUN describes looks pretty desirable next to that. It
looks even better next to some of the other cases currently before us which
JUSTICE BLACKMUN did not select as the vehicle for his announcement that
the death penalty is always unconstitutional-for example, the case of the
11-year-old girl raped by four men and then killed by stuffing her panties
down her throat. How enviable a quiet death by lethal injection compared
with that!
Id. at 1142-43 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
5 See, e.g., HELEN PREJEAN, C.S.J., DEAD MAN WALKING: AN EYEWITNESS
ACCOUNT OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE UNITED STATES 122-23 (1993) (recounting
a conversation between Sister Helen Prejean, who served as a spiritual advisor to
death row inmate Patrick Sonnier prior to his execution, and the prison chaplain).
Of course, those who justify retaliation can cite as authority numerous
passages in the Bible, where divine vengeance is meted out to guilty and
innocent alike: the Great Flood, the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah,
the slaying of the firstborn sons of the Egyptians .... to mention just a few
examples. Even the Pauline injunction "Vengeance is mine, says the Lord, I
will repay" can be interpreted as a command and a promise-the command
to restrain individual impulses toward revenge in exchange for the assur-
ance that God will be only too pleased to handle the grievance--in spades.
That God wants to "get even" like the rest of us does not seem to be in
question.
First, I can't accept that God has fits of rage and goes about trucking in
retaliation. Second, I can't accept that any group of human beings is trust-
worthy enough to mete out so ultimate and irreversible a punishment as
death. And, third, I can't accept that it's permissible to kill people provided
you "prepare" them with good spiritual counsel to "meet their Maker."....
Id. at 123 (footnotes omitted); see also VERNON W. REDEKOP, A LIFE FOR A LIFE?
DEATH PENALTY ON TRIAL 37 (1990) ("The biblical word, 'Vengeance is mine; I will
repay, says the Lord,' could be read, Punishment is for me; I will do the punishing,
says the Lord.'").
6 See BEDAU, supra note 1, at 9-10 ("Central among these ethical considerations
are the value, worth, and dignity of persons-the victims of crime, the offenders,
and the rest of society."); CARRINGTON, supra note 3, at 136 ("Society has not only a
right but an affirmative duty to punish those who transgress against its members.");
TOM SORELL, MORAL THEORY AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 57 (1988) (contrasting
utilitarian theory, which supports the idea that the deterrent effect of capital pun-
ishment makes "the execution of [violent] criminals.., right or at least morally
permissible[,]" with the Christian ethical theory, which is "[airranged into precepts
flowing from a principle about charity or love").
7 See CARRINGTON, supra note 3, at 82-112 (discussing the deterrent and inca-
pacitation effects of capital punishment as support for the death penalty).
8 For a compelling dramatization of the fierce emotions on both sides of the
death penalty debate, see the film version of Sister Prejean's book, supra note 5,
DEAD MAN WALKING (Gramercy Pictures 1995).
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sonable persons on both sides of the line would have to agree
that if we are to have a death penalty, it must be justly adminis-
tered. Death is the most extreme form of punishment; the ut-
most care is required in its imposition.9 There are few who
would knowingly support a system that imposed death without
granting the defendant due process," that discriminated by race
or class of the defendant or victim, or regularly resulted in the
execution of the innocent.
Indeed, the law demands protection against such evils if the
death penalty is to be imposed. In Furman v. Georgia," the Su-
preme Court, in a 5-4 decision, struck down Georgia's death
penalty on the grounds that, while the death penalty was not in
and of itself unconstitutional, 3 its arbitrary application under
the Georgia statute rendered it cruel and unusual. 4 The Fur-
man decision was the longest in the Court's history, at 50,000
words, 243 pages. 5 Despite its length, however, Furman offered
little guidance as to the constitutional application of a death
o See Calis v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1143 (1994) (denying certiorari)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). In his eloquent dissent, Justice Blackmun stressed the
finality and the seriousness of imposing the death penalty:
The wheels ofjustice will churn again, and somewhere, another jury or an-
other judge will have the unenviable task of determining whether some
human being is to live or die. We hope, of course, that the defendant whose
life is at risk will be represented by competent counsel-someone who is
inspired by the awareness that a less than vigorous defense truly could
have fatal consequences for the defendant. We hope that the attorney
will... appear before a judge who is still committed to the protection of de-
fendants' rights.... In the same vein, we hope that the prosecution, in
urging the penalty of death, will have exercised its discretion wisely, free
from bias, prejudice, or political motive, and will be humbled, rather than
emboldened, by the awesome authority conferred by the State.
Id.
10 See Prejean v. Maggio, 765 F.2d 482, 484 (1985) (noting that "[slubstantive
due process requires that a state follow procedures that insure against arbitrary or
capricious imposition of the death penalty") (emphasis added).
" 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
12 See GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1005 (Supp. 1971), amended by GA. CODE ANN. § 17-
10-30 (1998).
'3 See Furman, 408 U.S. at 241 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("It has been assumed
in our decisions that punishment by death is not cruel, unless the manner of execu-
tion can be said to be inhuman and barbarous.") (citations omitted).
'4 See id. at 253 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("Under these laws no standards gov-
ern the selection of the penalty. People live or die, dependent on the whim of one
man or of 12.").
'" See BOB WOODWARD & SCoTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE
SUPREME COURT 260 (1979) [hereinafter "THE BRETHREN"].
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penalty; the justices wrote nine different opinions, and they con-
tinued to interpret and reinterpret the holdings of Furman in
later cases. 6 The Supreme Court has not addressed many of the
constitutional implications of the relatively new federal death
penalty,' including the fair administration of pre-trial proceed-
ings. However, three recent decisions by federal district courts
in Rhode Island and Connecticut have limited the discovery
rights of defendants in capital cases. 8 These decisions warrant
examination, mindful that defendants, even innocent ones, are
often only separated from a death sentence by the niceties of
procedure. 9
This Note argues for broadening the defendant's right to dis-
covery in the early stages of a potential federal capital case. Part
I sets forth the procedure a U.S. Attorney must follow in order to
obtain permission to file a notice of intent to seek the death
penalty and explains the defendant's right to participate in that
process. Part I also reviews recent district court holdings limit-
ing defendants' rights to discovery in these early stages of a po-
tential death penalty case. Part II explores the need for special
care in the administration of death penalty cases because of the
finality of death and the limitations of the appeal process. Part
IlI examines the risk of racial bias in the imposition of the death
penalty and concludes that principles of equality and law de-
mand a heightened protection of the defendant's right to discov-
ery of "pattern of discrimination" materials. Finally, Part IV
submits that constitutional guarantees of the rights of due proc-
ess and effective counsel mandate that potential defendants be
16 See, e.g., McKleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (upholding Georgia's death
penalty statute against a claim that it was discriminatorily applied, and rejecting a
study offered by the petitioner supporting his claim); Woodson v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 280 (1976) (striking down North Carolina's mandatory death penalty stat-
ute on the grounds that a failure to sentence defendants individually violated the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).
17 See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, 21 U.S.C. § 848 (West 1994); Federal Death
Penalty Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 3591 (West 1994).
's See United States v. Feliciano, 998 F. Supp. 166 (D. Conn. 1998); United
States v. Boyd, 931 F. Supp. 968 (D.R.I. 1996); United States v. Roman, 931 F. Supp.
960 (D.R.I. 1996).
19 See Cochran & Co.: Death Penalty Survivors (Court-TV television broadcast,
Nov. 16, 1998) (statement by Peter Neufeld, civil rights lawyer and co-director of the
Innocence Project, an organization that assists in appeals by those wrongly con-
victed, that when an innocent defendant has no new evidence to present, he must
turn to the Constitution and to procedure to secure a reversal of his conviction).
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granted broader discovery rights.
I. DISCOVERY IN FEDERAL CAPITAL CASES: LAW AND PRECEDENT
A Seeking the Federal Death Penalty: The Department of Justice
Protocol
The Department of Justice has set forth procedures to be
followed by the United States Attorney's Office and the Attorney
General's Office in every federal case in which the death penalty
can be sought." A U.S. Attorney may not seek the death penalty
absent the Attorney General's prior written authorization.2
Whenever a defendant is charged with an offense subject to the
death penalty, the U.S. Attorney must submit to the Assistant
Attorney General for the Criminal Division a "Death Penalty
Evaluation form" and a prosecution memorandum, which will
include any aggravating and mitigating factors related to the
crime and the defendant, as well as the defendant's background
and criminal history. ' A committee appointed by the Attorney
General reviews the case and makes a recommendation to the
Attorney General, who ultimately may direct the U.S. Attorney
to file a notice of intent to seek the death penalty with the trial
court.23
The Department of Justice protocol also provides for the de-
fendant's participation in this pre-trial process.' The defendant
has the right to present evidence of mitigating factors to both the
U.S. Attorney's Office and the Attorney General's Committee. '
The United States Attorneys' Manual states at section 9-10.030:
At the time an indictment charging a defendant with an offense
subject to the death penalty is filed or unsealed, or before a
United States Attorney's Office decides to request approval to
seek the death penalty, whichever comes first, the United States
Attorney should give counsel for the defendant a reasonable op-
portunity to present any facts, including any mitigating factors,
20 See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATrORNEYS'
MANUAL § 9-10.000-.100 (1997) [hereinafter "USAI].
2 See id. § 9-10.020.
2See id- § 9-10.040.
2See id. § 9-10.050.
24 See id. § 9-10.030.
2See id. §§ 9-10.030 and 9-10.050.
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26to the United States Attorney for consideration.
Section 9-10.050 of the Manual states: "Counsel for the de-
fendant shall be provided an opportunity to present to the
[Attorney General's] Committee, orally or in writing, the reasons
why the death penalty should not be sought." 7 The Committee
considers all evidence presented to it, including evidence of racial
bias, before making its recommendation.' The Committee bal-
ances the mitigating and aggravating factors and will recom-
mend the filing of a notice of intent to seek the death penalty
only if the statutory and non-statutory aggravating factors out-
weigh the mitigating factors. 29 While "any mitigating factor rea-
sonably raised by the evidence should be considered in the light
most favorable to the defendant,"30 aggravating factors only
"qualify for consideration in this analysis... [if they are] found
to exist beyond a reasonable doubt."
31
Since the defendant is permitted to present evidence on his
or her behalf in this pre-trial stage of the proceeding, and be-
cause the Committee is compelled to consider it, a question has
arisen regarding how much, if any, discovery the defendant
should be entitled to in order to facilitate the presentation of this
evidence. The federal district courts in the cases that follow
considered this question.
B. The District Court Cases: Feliciano, Boyd, and Roman
The defendants in United States v. Feliciano2 were charged
with a violent crime in aid of racketeering.' They moved for dis-
covery of material they alleged was necessary to facilitate their
presentation of evidence to the U.S. Attorney's office under sec-
tion 9-10.030 of the United States Attorneys' Manual.'
The Feliciano defendants made their motions following a
discovery conference during which the government informed
them "of the opportunity to provide any information the defense
26 Id. § 9-10.030.
27 Id. § 9-10.050.




Feliciano, 998 F. Supp. 166 (D. Conn. 1998).
s See id. at 168; 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(5) (1994).
34 See Feliciano, 998 F. Supp. at 168; supra notes 24-31 and accompanying text.
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deems relevant to the issue of mitigation which the government
should consider in determining whether to seek the death pen-
alty."35 The government nonetheless opposed the discovery mo-
tions as "premature."36
The defendants sought disclosure of both aggravating and
mitigating factors, including "[elvidence that the government has
prosecuted minorities with death-eligible offenses with greater
frequency than it has prosecuted whites who have committed
similar offenses."37
The district court dealt perfunctorily with the defendants'
motion to discover aggravating factors. It ruled that the defen-
dants were not entitled to discovery of aggravating factors the
U.S. Attorney presented to the Assistant Attorney General if
those factors were not subsequently to be presented in the pen-
alty phase38-- though under section 9-10.050 of the U.S. Attor-
neys' Manual, the Attorney General's Committee would still be
entitled to consider those factors in determining whether to rec-
ommend seeking the death penalty. 9 With respect to discovery
of aggravating factors that would be deemed relevant in the
penalty phase, the district court ruled that the defendants were
not entitled to such materials until the U.S. Attorney had filed a
notice of intent to seek the death penalty4 -- after the defendants'
opportunity to present evidence to the U.S. Attorney and the At-
torney General's Committee had already passed.4'
5 Feliciano, 998 F. Supp. at 168.
asId,
I71 at 173. In addition, the defendants sought as mitigating evidence: evidence
relating to "equally culpable" defendants who were charged with the same murder
but were not facing the death penalty, id. at 170; evidence that the victims had
"knowingly exposed" themselves to "deadly force" as active members of "rival
gangs," id- at 171; evidence relating to co-conspirators and co-defendants who had
committed other death-eligible offenses in furtherance of the charged criminal en-
terprise, but who were not facing the death penalty, see id. at 172; and evidence re-
lating to other co-conspirators or co-defendants who had committed other death-
eligible offenses in furtherance of other racketeering enterprises within the state of
Connecticut, see id. at 173. The scope of the defendants' motions led the government
to also oppose them as "overbroad." Id- at 168.
58 See id. at 175.
"See USAM, supra note 20, § 9-10.050 ("The Committee will consider all infor-
mation presented to it.. .).
4" See United States v. Feliciano, 998 F. Supp. 166, 175 (D. Conn. 1998).
41 See USAM, supra note 20, § 9-10.030 (providing that the defendant have an
opportunity to present evidence to the United States Attorney "[alt the time an in-
dictment charging [the] defendant with an offense subject to the death penalty is
1999]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
The district court's discussion of mitigating factors was more
extensive. In all criminal cases, the defendant's pre-trial discov-
ery of mitigating factors is governed by the rule in Brady v.
42Maryland, upon which the Feliciano defendants relied.' In
Brady, a criminal prosecution for murder committed during the
perpetration of a robbery," the Supreme Court held "that the
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an ac-
cused upon request violates due process where the evidence is
material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good
faith or bad faith of the prosecution." 5 Despite the fact that the
Feliciano defendants were entitled to present mitigating evi-
dence to attempt to dissuade the government from filing a notice
of intent to seek the death penalty,46 prior to trial, the district
court ruled that they were only entitled to discovery of mitigat-
ing factors that would also mitigate at the penalty phase, follow-
ing a conviction."7
The district court considered the defendants' request for evi-
dence of racial disparity separately,48 applying the Armstrong 9
standard for discovery of selective prosecution material. Under
Armstrong, a defendant claiming that he or she is being selec-
tively prosecuted on the basis of race must prove "that similarly
situated individuals of a different race were not prosecuted.""
The Armstrong standard for discovery of material to support this
claim is strikingly similar to the standard of proof for the claim
itself: In order to compel the prosecution to turn over material
tending to prove selective prosecution, the defendant must
"produce some evidence that similarly situated defendants of
filed or unsealed, or before a United States Attorney's Office decides to request ap-
proval to seek the death penalty"); see also id. § 9-10.050 (providing that the defen-
dant have an opportunity to present evidence to the Attorney General's Committee
prior to its recommendation to the Attorney General).
42 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
4 See Feliciano, 998 F. Supp. at 168. The Feliciano defendants also cited the
Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16.
See id.
"See Brady, 373 U.S. at 85.
45 Id. at 87 (emphasis added).
46 See USAM, supra note 20, § 9-10.030.
47 See Feliciano, 998 F. Supp. at 172.
See id. at 173-74.
49 See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996).
50 Id. at 465 (citing Ah Sin v. Wittman, 198 U.S. 500 (1905)).
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other races could have been prosecuted, but were not."5 The re-
sult is that defendants must have evidence of selective prosecu-
tion before they can get evidence of selective prosecution. The
Feliciano court ruled that the defendants had not met this bur-
den.52
In reaching its decision, the Feliciano court relied, in part,
on the interpretation of the United States Attorneys' Manual by
the District of Rhode Island in United States v. Roman." The
Roman court ruled that the Department of Justice protocol
merely sets forth internal procedure and "does not create sub-
stantive or procedural rights."' Therefore, the defendant, who
had been charged with racketeering,"5 was not entitled to discov-
ery of any "information relevant to the decision to seek the death
penalty."56 The following week, the same district court ruled on a
discovery motion made by the defendants in United States v.
Boyd,57 a case involving the same event and one of the same de-
fendants as Roman.58 The Boyd defendants sought discovery of
aggravating factors, this time claiming violation of their Sixth
Amendment right to effective counsel.59 The defendants alleged
that without discovery, their attorneys could not adequately rep-
resent them60 when offering evidence to the U.S. Attorney or At-
torney General's Committee, pursuant to sections 9-10.030 and
9-10.050 of the United States Attorneys' Manual.6' The court
denied discovery of the aggravating factors on the grounds that
the Department of Justice death penalty authorization procedure.
was not a critical stage in the proceedings and, therefore, denial
of discovery did not violate the defendants' Sixth Amendment
61 Id at 469.
62 See Feliciano, 998 F. Supp. at 174. The discovery of material evidencing racial
disparity in the imposition of the death penalty is discussed more extensively infra
Part III.
63 931 F. Supp. 960 (D.R.I. 1996); see Feliciano, 998 F. Supp. at 169 (citing Ro-
man, 931 F. Supp. at 964).
Roman, 931 F. Supp. at 964.
See id. at 962. The defendant was eligible for the death penalty because he
was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 3591.
I8 at 964.
57 931 F. Supp. 968 (D.R.I. 1996).
See id at 969.
See id.
ca See idi6' See USAM, supra note 20, §§ 9-10.030, 9-10.050.
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rights. 62
II. THE NEED FOR CARE: THE PHYSICAL FINALITY OF DEATH AND
THE LEGAL FINALITY OF A DEATH SENTENCE
In a time when race often "plays a decisive role"' in sentenc-
ing, and quality legal representation is largely unavailable to the
poor, courts are simultaneously stream-lining the judicial proc-
ess, thereby "facilitating swifter executions."6 In 1998, facing
"undeniable evidence" that innocent people were being sentenced
to die, the American Bar Association called for a moratorium on
all executions at the state level.'
It cannot be denied: Death is forever.' Since one cannot
"take back" an execution once it has been carried out, extreme
care must be exercised in deciding whom to execute. Chief Jus-
tice William Rehnquist conceded that the imposition of the death
penalty requires extremely attentive review.6 7 "Nothing could be
more contrary to contemporary standards of decency or more
shocking to the conscience than to execute a person who is ac-
tually innocent."' Yet, more defendants are wrongly sentenced
to death than most people would probably feel comfortable ad-
mitting; in the last 20 years at least 70 people in the United
States have been released from death rows after being found in-
nocent 9  Innocent people are convicted on false testimony by
2See Boyd, 931 F. Supp. at 973. The argument that denial of discovery in this
phase violates the defendant's right to effective counsel is discussed extensively in-
fra Part IV.
Stephen B. Bright, Death Penalty Moratorium: Fairness, Integrity at Stake, 13
CRIM. JUST. 28,29 (1998).6 Id.
See id.
6See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 323 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting) ("One of the principal reasons why death is different is because it is irre-
versible....").
7See David Von Drehle, When Harry Met Scalia: Why the Death Penalty is Dy-
ing, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 1994, at C3, available in 1994 WL 2274882.
6Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 430 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted).
See Bright, supra note 63, at 30; see also Joseph P. Shapiro, The Wrong Men
on Death Row: A Growing Number of Bad Convictions Challenges the Death Pen-
alty's Fairness, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 9, 1998, at 22 (stating that since
1976 there have been 486 executions and for every 7 executions, 1 other prisoner on
death row has been found innocent); Justice Stevens Criticizes Election of Judges,
WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 1996, at A14 (quoting Supreme Court Justice John Paul Ste-
vens) (" The recent development of reliable scientific evidentiary methods has made
[73:541
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jailhouse informants,0 mistaken eyewitness identifications, 7' and
coerced confessions.72 In 1992, Jay Smith was released from
prison after spending six years on death row-the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court ruled that the prosecutor had hidden evidence
and lied to the jury.7"
Convicted murderers are not necessarily being released from
prison on technicalities; in many cases, they are exonerated by
DNA evidence74 or when the real killers are found.75 Sometimes,
it possible to establish conclusively that a disturbing number of persons who had
been sentenced to death were actually innocent.' ").70 See Abraham McLaughlin, Tales of Journey from Death Row to Freedom: Con-
ference Put on by Critics Intended to Raise Question: How Many Innocents Are Being
Executed?, CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, Nov. 16, 1998, at 3 (reporting that one-third of
death row inmates later exonerated were convicted by false testimony from jail-
house informants), available in 1998 WL 2371951.
71 See id.; see also Welsh S. White, Government Psychiatric Examinations and
the Death Penalty, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 869, 886-87 (citing United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218 (1967)) (indicating that current police line-up procedures are conducive to
mistaken identifications); cf Erica Beecher-Monas, Blinded by Science: How Judges
Avoid the Science in Scientific Evidence, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 55, 56 (1998) (recognizing
the frequent unreliability of "scientific" evidence, such as "hair identification, bite-
mark analysis, voice spectography, [and] handwriting analysis").
7See, e.g., Leonard Pitts Jr., A Wrongful Sentence Compelling Reason to Scrap
the Death Penalty, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 24, 1998, at 25 (describing the conviction, death
sentence, and later release of Freddie Pitts and Wilbert Lee), available in 1998 WL
2919190. Pitts and Lee were both beaten into confessing.
Thirty-five years ago, Pitts, now a 54-year-old trucker, and Lee, a 62-year-
old Miami-Dade County corrections officer, were savagely beaten by sher-
iffs deputies until they confessed to a double murder in Port St. Joe, Fla.
When the death sentence was handed down, said Pitts, "I was still rather
dazed and confused by all the beatings. I don't think it ever really sunk
Id. (omission in original); see also Gail Johnson, False Confessions and Fundamental
Fairness: The Need For Electronic Recording Of Custodial Interrogations, 6 B.U.
PUB. INT. L.J. 719 (indicating the need for electronic recording of interrogations to
ensure against coerced confessions); Howard S. Liberson, Note and Comment, Peo-
ple v. Cahill--California and Coerced Confessions---'Harmless" Evidentiary Bomb-
shell, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1559, 1572 (1994) (discussing a case in which a conviction
was reversed because the defendant had been coerced to confess "by the police offi-
cers' 'implied promise of benefit or leniency' ").
73 See McLaughlin, supra note 70.
' See id. ("In Kirk Bloodsworth's case, DNA alone led to exoneration. This
blond, burly former marine was put on Maryland's death row in 1984 for the rape
and murder of a young girl-based largely on an eyewitness identification. But a
1993 DNA test indicated Mr. Bloodsworth wasn't at the scene. He was released.");
Shapiro, supra note 69 (reporting that, in the last ten years, ten people have been
released from death row on the basis of DNA evidence).
7' See Michael J. Muskat, Note, Substantive Justice and State Interests in the
Aftermath of Herrera v. Collins: Finding an Adequate Process for the Resolution of
1999]
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however, exoneration does not come until much later, and the
wrongly convicted who are lucky enough to be released must
continue to live under a shadow of suspicion.6 In 1993, Gary
Gauger found his parents dead, their throats slashed.77 Police
interrogated Gauger for eighteen hours about the slaying, even-
tually convincing him that he had murdered his parents during
an alcoholic blackout by telling him they had a "stack of evi-
dence" against him.7' By the time the year was over, Gauger had
been convicted, with no physical evidence, 79 of slashing his par-
ents' throats and leaving their bodies rolled-up in pieces of car-
pet at their Illinois farm.' At trial, the police testified that
Gauger had confessed.8 ' He was under sentence of death until
Bare Innocence Claims Through State Post Conviction Remedies, 75 TEX. L. REV.
131, 133 n.6 (1996) (noting cases in which innocent people were released when the
real killer came forward).
76 See Christine Alice Corcos, Presuming Innocence: Alan Pakula and Scott
Turow Take on the Great American Legal Fiction, 20 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 129
(1997) (discussing film that illustrates the public's continued suspicion of accused
individuals despite the legal presumption of innocence).
77 See Shapiro, supra note 69, at 22.
78 See id. at 24.
[Ilt was Gauger's trusting nature that gave police a murder tale that day in
1993. Gauger says that during 18 hours of nonstop interrogation, detec-
tives insisted they had a "stack of evidence" against him. They didn't-but
it never occurred to the laid-back farmer that his accusers might be lying.
Instead, he worried he might have blacked out the way he sometimes did
in the days when he drank heavily. So Gauger went along with police sug-
gestions that, to jog his memory, he hypothetically describe the murders.
After viewing photos of his mother's slit throat, Gauger explained how he
could have walked into her rug shop next to the house ("she knows and
trusts me"), pulled her hair, slashed her throat and then done the same to
his dad as he worked in his nearby antique-motorcycle shop. To police, this
was a chilling confession. Even Gauger, by this point suicidal, believed he
must have committed the crimes.
Id.
,' See Carolyn Tuft, In the Past 10 Years, 8 in Illinois Were Sentenced to Die,
Later Found Innocent, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH, Apr. 12, 1998, at A7, available in
1998 WL 3329588; see also CBS Evening News (CBS television broadcast, Nov. 10,
1998) (indicating that the only solid evidence in the case was a series of statements
Gauger gave to the police after 14 hours of interrogation), available in 1998 WL
5149700.
w See Ray Quintanilla & Meg Murphy, 17 Indicted in Trail of Violence by Biker
Gang: Gauger Slayings Linked to Robbery by the Outlaws, CHI. TRIB., June 11, 1997,
at 1, available in 1997 WL 3557502.
81 See CBS Evening News, supra note 79; see also Shapiro, supra note 69, at 24
("At Gauger's trial, a fellow inmate made a dubious claim to hearing Gauger confess.
The man, contacted in jail by U.S. News, offered to tell a very different story if the
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September 1994, when Professor Laurence Marshall and his
students at Northwestern University got Gauger's sentence re-
duced to life in prison.82 He was released two years later when
the appellate court ruled that the police had had no probable
cause to arrest him.' Only after Gauger's release, however, did
the police admit that they truly had the wrong man. In the
course of investigating a crime spree throughout Illinois and
Wisconsin by members of a gang called the Outlaws, the police
identified Randall E. Miller and James W. Schneider as the
likely murderers of Mr. Gauger's parents.'
The lead prosecutor in the Gauger case later acknowledged
that "important information linking the slayings of Gauger's
parents to Outlaws members began trickling in while Gauger
was in prison." 8 Yet, in some instances, prosecutors have con-
tinued to oppose exoneration of a convicted defendant, even after
another person has actually confessed to the crime.'
Perhaps the most infamous example of procedural flaws
leading to wrongful execution is the 1995 execution of Jesse De-
wayne Jacobs. Jacobs was convicted of murder in Texas and
sentenced to death. He had been at the scene of the crime,
waived his right to counsel, and agreed to confess to the murder
on condition that the district attorney promise to seek the death
penalty-Jacobs believed that execution was preferable to life in
prison.87  At trial, however, Jacobs pleaded not guilty and re-
magazine would pay for an interview.").
a See Shapiro, supra note 69, at 26.
"3 See id.; see also Tuft, supra note 79, at A7.
See Carolyn Starks, Wisconsin Crime Led to Biker Suspect: Police Saw Simi-
larities Between 1995 Burglary and Richmond Killings, CEI. TRM., June 12, 1997, at
1; Tom Held, Justice Gets 2d Chance in Murder Case: Victims' Son Wants Fair
Trial, No Death Penalty Threat for Accused Outlaws, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL,
June 12, 1997, at 1.
t' Quintanilla & Murphy, supra note 80, at 18 (quoting Phillip Prossnitz of the
District Attorney's office of McHenry County, Illinois).
8 See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 69, at 22 ("Even when another person confesses
the legal system can be slow to respond."). In 1983, Alejandro Hernandez and Ro-
lando Cruz were sentenced to death for the rape and murder of a ten-year-old girl.
Another man, Brian Dugan, later confessed to the crime but was never tried. In-
stead, Hernandez and Cruz were tried two more times. At the final trial in 1995, a
police officer admitted on the stand that he had previously lied under oath. Her-
nandez and Cruz were acquitted and several police officers and former prosecutors
were charged with official misconduct. See Tuft, supra note 79, at AT.
See David Blumberg, Note, Habeas Leaps from the Pan into the Fire: Jacobs v.
Scott and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 61 ALA. L. REV.
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canted his confession, offering a different version of the murder
and implicating his sister, Bobbie Hogan, as the killer.' Al-
though Jacobs was convicted, the state later tried Hogan as the
sole murderer, relying extensively on testimony by Jacobs. 9 In
open court the prosecutor stated that he had changed his mind
about what actually happened and that he was convinced that
Bobbie Hogan was the one who pulled the trigger and that Jesse
Jacobs was telling the truth.' Nevertheless, the state opposed
Jacobs' appeals in state court and his habeas corpus petition in
federal court,9 asserting that "[d]espite these post-trial develop-
ments.., it [could] constitutionally carry out Jacobs' death sen-
tence."92 Despite the prosecution's disavowal of Jacobs's confes-
sion and the unavailability of the death penalty for co-
conspirators under Texas law, the Fifth Circuit upheld Jacobs's
death sentence on the grounds that he had failed to prove "an
independent constitutional violation."" The Supreme Court de-
nied an application for a stay of execution and petition for certio-
rari.94
The Jacobs case serves to illustrate the de facto legal finality
of a death sentence.95 Since Jacobs, a prisoner's ability to chal-
lenge his or her conviction or sentence has become even more
limited, due to federal habeas reform enacted in the Anti-
terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).9 6
The major argument for limiting habeas relief is based on a
need for judicial efficiency and "finality" in the judicial process.'
To accomplish this end, the AEDPA imposes time limits, proce-
dural limits, and limits on the number of petitions that may be
557, 562 (1997); Jacobs v. Scott, 513 U.S. 1067, 1067 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
"See Jacobs v. Scott, 513 U.S. at 1068 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
8See Blumberg, supra note 87, at 564-67.
go See id. at 564-65.
' See id. at 565.
9Jacobs, 513 U.S. at 1069 (Stevens and Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
9Blumberg, supra note 87, at 566 (quoting Jacobs v. Scott, 31 F.3d 1319, 1324
(5th Cir. 1994)).
9See Jacobs v. Scott, 513 U.S. at 1067.
95 De facto means in fact, actually. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 416 (6th ed.
1990).
6See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254-55 (1994).
97 See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 392 (1993); Blumberg, supra note
87, at 562, 566.
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filed,98 as well as limitations on the grounds for which habeas re-
lief may be granted." For example, federal prisoners challenging
the imposition of a sentence may be granted habeas relief on one
of only four grounds: (1) that the sentence was imposed in viola-
tion of the Constitution or the laws of the United States; (2) that
the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence; (3)
that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by
law; (4) that the sentence is subject to collateral attack.' ° The
net effect of federal habeas reform is that it is significantly more
difficult for convicted petitioners to remedy constitutional defects
in their convictions or sentencing."
III. CHALLENGING RACIAL BIAS: THE ERRONEOUS APPLICATION OF
THE ARMSTRONG STANDARD TO DISCOVERY OF "PATTERN OF
DISCRIMINATION" MATERIALS
At the federal level, the Department of Justice protocol po-
tentially provides a safeguard against racial bias in sentencing
by requiring the Attorney General's Committee to consider any
evidence presented by the defendant "that the Department has
engaged in a pattern or practice of racial discrimination in the
administration of the Federal death penalty.""2 The defendants
in Feliciano and Roman sought discovery of such material, but
their motions failed because they could not meet the stringent
test of Armstrong." In Roman, the court denied discovery be-
cause the defendants had failed to offer evidence that the United
States Attorney had not pursued the death penalty in cases of
similarly-situated defendants of a different race'L-though this
is precisely what the defendants were attempting to discover.
Whether the Armstrong standard is proper under any cir-
08 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254-55 (1994).
See id.
'o" See id.; see also Kevin T. Godlewski & Michael Golden, Habeas Relief for
Federal Prisoners, 85 GEO. L.J. 1545 (1997) (outlining jurisdiction, venue, and rec-
ognizable claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1994)).
101 See generally Godlewski & Golden, supra note 100. Some critics have also
suggested that the habeas provisions of the AEDPA violate the constitutional guar-
antees of due process. See, e.g., A.B.A. Panel Discussion, Dead Man Walking without
Due Process? A Discussion of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996223 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 163 (1997).USAM, supra note 20, § 9-10.050.10 For a discussion of the Feliciano and Roman cases see supra Part I.B.
'0 See United States v. Roman, 931 F. Supp. 960, 968 (D.R.I. 1996).
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cumstances is debatable."° Regardless, its application in federal
capital cases is legally unsound. The circumstances of Arm-
strong are clearly distinguishable from the district court cases in
which it was invoked: In Armstrong the defendant claimed se-
lective prosecution.'9 In the cases discussed above, the defen-
dants were not seeking to have their indictments dismissed, as
was acknowledged by the court in FelicianoY Rather, the de-
fendants sought to obtain evidence they were entitled to have
considered by the Government, in attempting to dissuade it from
seeking the death penalty. Recognizing the broad discretion
granted to the Government in deciding whom to prosecute,' the
Armstrong court placed the burden of proving selective prosecu-
tion squarely on the shoulders of the defendant."9 In contrast,
the prosecutor in a capital case has little discretion in determin-
ing whether to seek the death penalty: The authorization proc-
ess is strictly governed by the United States Attorneys' Manual
and the prosecutor cannot file a notice of intent without the
permission of the Attorney General."0 The U.S. Attorney who
wishes to seek the death penalty has the burden of proving to the
Attorney General's Committee the existence of aggravating fac-
tors "beyond a reasonable doubt,""' while any mitigating factor
"reasonably raised by the evidence should be considered in the
light most favorable to the defendant.""2 Clearly, then, the dis-
trict courts were wrong to apply the Armstrong test.
However, applying the Armstrong test to discovery by capital
defendants is not only a mistake of law, it is also fundamentally
unjust. In his Furman v. Georgia concurrence, Justice Douglas
stated that "[ilt would seem to be incontestable that the death
'05 See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text (discussing the circular nature
of the Armstrong test). For a justification of the Armstrong test, see United States v.
Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 468 (1996) ("Discovery ... imposes many of the costs pres-
ent when the Government must respond to a prima facie case of selective prosecu-
tion.... The justifications for a rigorous standard for the elements of a selective-
prosecution claim thus require a correspondingly rigorous standard for discovery in
aid of such claim.").
ID6 See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 459.
'07 See United States v. Feliciano, 998 F. Supp. 166, 174 (D. Conn. 1998).
See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464.
See id. at 465-66.
11 See USAM, supra note 20, § 9-10.030.
. Id. § 9-10.080.
112 Id.
556 [73:541
BECAUSE DEATH IS DIFFERENT
penalty inflicted on one defendant is 'unusual' if it discriminates
against him by reason of his race, religion, wealth, social posi-
tion, or class, or if it is imposed under a procedure that gives
room for the play of such prejudices.""' The guidelines set down
by Feliciano and Roman constitute just such a procedure.
The history of capital punishment in this country reflects
our nation's sad history of racial inequality."4 Between 1930 and
1989, 3984 people were lawfully executed."5 Two thousand one
hundred and thirteen of those people were black, "over half of
the, total and almost five times the proportion of blacks in the
population as a whole." 16  The plurality in Furman recognized
that death penalty statutes, as administered in 1972, violated
the Constitutional proscription against "cruel and unusual pun-
ishment" because they allowed the death penalty to be discrimi-
natorily imposed:" 7 " 'The vice in this case is not in the penalty
but in the process by which it is inflicted. It is unfair to inflict
unequal penalties on equally guilty parties .... "18
Despite the warning of Furman, there continues to be sig-
nificant racial disparity in the administration of the death pen-
alty at the state level, not only according to the race of the de-
fendant,"' but also according to the race of the victim.uo In 1990,
13 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 242 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(emphasis added).14 See generally CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (Hugh Adam Be-
dau & Chester M. Pierce eds. 1975); SAMUEL R. GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH &
DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL SENTENCING (1989) [hereinafter
"DISCRIMiNATION"]; RAYMOND PATERNOSTER, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA
(1991).
See DISCRIMINATION, supra note 114, at 17.
Id- (footnotes omitted).
"7 See Furman, 408 U.S. at 245 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("[1It is 'cruel and un-
usual' to apply the death penalty-or any other penalty-selectively to minorities
whose numbers are few, who are outcasts of society, and who are unpopular, but
whom society is willing to see suffer though it would not countenance general appli-
cation of the same penalty across the board.") (footnote omitted).
18 Furman, 408 U.S. at 247-48 (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting Ernest van
den Haag at the hearings on the Death Penalty Suspension Act, H.R. 8417, before
Subcommittee No. 3, House Committee of the Judiciary, 92d Cong. 116-17 (1972)).
11 See, e.g., Robin L. West, Justice and Care, 70 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 31, 33 (1996)
("We will also be inspected, measured, held to account for our breaches, for our cul-
ture's failure to administer the death penalty evenhandedly between black and
white offenders .... .") (footnote omitted); Blackmun Reevaluating His Death Penalty
Stand Supreme Court Justice Says He Is Now Uncertain About Constitutionality of
Executions, WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 1993, at A4 (noting Justice Blackmun's concern
"about studies suggesting that blacks disproportionately suffer from application of
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the United States General Accounting Office released its analy-
sis of twenty-eight studies of death penalty sentencing.'2 The
report stated that the "race of [the] victim was found to influence
the likelihood of being charged with capital murder or receiving
the death penalty, i.e., those who murdered whites were found to
be more likely to be sentenced to death than those who murdered
blacks."' While black persons make up 12% of the population,
almost 40% of those executed between 1976 and 1996 were
black.' "Justice demands"' that we guard against recreating in
the federal system the inequities found in the states. "If we are
to be moral, we can do no less.""
IV. UPHOLDING THE CONSTITUTION BY BROADENING DISCOVERY:
DUE PROCESS AND THE RIGHT To COUNSEL
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution
provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.""
In Powell v. Alabama, 1 7 the seminal case in Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence," the Supreme Court held that the right to coun-
sel was fundamental to ensuring a fair trial."9 The right to
counsel is, therefore, central to the constitutional guarantee of
the death penalty").
120 See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT To SENATE AND
HOUSE COMMITTEES ON THE JUDICIARY, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: RESEARCH
INDICATES PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES, 5-6 (1990) [hereinafter "U.S. G.A.O.
Report"].
1 See generally U.S. G.A.O. Report, supra note 120.
122 Id. at 5 (noting "[this finding was remarkably consistent across data sets,
states, data collection methods, and analytic techniques."); see also Bright, supra
note 63, at 32; DISCRIMINATION, supra note 114, at 45 (discussing capital sentencing
in Georgia, Florida, and Illinois, and stating that "when we control for the race of
the victim, blacks who killed whites were several times more likely to be sentenced
to death than whites who killed whites in each state.").
1'2 See Berta Esperanza Hernndez-Truyol, Building Bridges: Bringing Interna-
tional Human Rights Home, 9 LA RAZA L.J. 69, 76 (1996).
124 West, supra note 119, at 33 ("These injustices must be righted; justice de-
mands it.").
125 Id.
126 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
127 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
128 See ALFREDO GARCIA, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT IN MODERN JURISPRUDENCE 4
(1992).
29 See Powell, 287 U.S. at 68-72.
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due process."'
The boundaries of due process"' are not rigidly delineated,
so that in any proceeding "the question remains what process is
due.""' It is a fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence
"that due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protec-
tions as the particular situation demands." " Judicial recogni-
tion of the fluidity of the due process concept allowed the Fur-
man Court to develop the "death is different" doctrine,
demanding that special care be taken in the administration of
death penalty proceedings.' Due to its seriousness, "[t]he death
penalty requires the maximum measure of due process. ""s5
A. The Department of Justice Authorization Process is a Critical
Stage of the Proceeding to which the Sixth Amendment Applies
In Boyd, the defendant argued that denying him discovery
denied him the effective representation of counsel during the
death penalty authorization process." 6 The guarantee of the
Sixth Amendment, however, only extends to "critical" stages of
the proceeding. 7 The Boyd court ruled that the authorization
process was not a critical stage and, therefore, the defendant's
right to counsel was not implicated.3 8
The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to counsel "[iln
all criminal prosecutions."' 9 A "prosecution" is "[tihe continuous
13 See DAVID J. BODENHAIAER, FAIR TRIAL: RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 93-94 (1992) ("By accepted definition, any action to deny this
right would also deny due process."); see also RICHARD C. CORTNER & CLIFFORD M.
LYTLE, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 150 (1971) ("The right to counsel clearly is
the best known and most firmly established right in a criminal proceeding."); MARC
WEBER TOBIAS & R. DAVID PETERSEN, PRE-TRIAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A SURvEY
OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 33 (1972) [hereinafter "PROCEDURE"] ("If either a state
or federal court denies the defendant the right to be represented by counsel, he is
denied due process of law.").
'3' See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.").
'2 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
'33 Id. ("It has been said so often by this Court and others as not to require cita-
tion of authority....").
13 See ARBITRARINESS, supra note 1, at 30.
"" See United States v. Boyd, 931 F. Supp. 968, 969-70 (D.R.I. 1996).
137 See PROCEDURE, supra note 130, at 285.
1-3 See Boyd, 931 F. Supp. at 973.
'39 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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following up, through instrumentalities created by law, of a per-
son accused of a public offense with a steady and fixed purpose of
reaching a judicial determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused." 40 Thus, the "prosecution" is not limited to the actual
trial. In fact, the Supreme Court has broadly construed the term
"criminal prosecution" to mean that the Constitution guarantees
the right to counsel in a variety of circumstances that are not,
strictly speaking, the trial.'
In Coleman v. Alabama', the Supreme Court ruled that the
right to counsel attached at a preliminary evidentiary hearing in
a criminal prosecution for murder. As they considered the case,
the justices of the Burger Court wavered on whether the pre-
liminary hearing was actually a critical stage.'" But a memo
from Justice Black to the Chief Justice' laid down what would
eventually become the conceptual foundation of the Coleman
majority's opinion: That a defendant is entitled to counsel not
merely at trial, but from the first moment he or she needs it.'"
The preliminary hearing in Coleman is analogous to the pro-
'4 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1221 (6th ed. 1990).
141 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966) (holding that the prose-
cution cannot use defendant's statements from a custodial interrogation unless pro-
cedural safeguards have been used). "If... [defendant] indicates in any manner and
at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speak-
ing there can be no questioning." Id- (emphasis added). Thus, in Miranda, the de-
fendant's right to counsel was triggered when he was questioned at the station
house. See id. at 445. The Supreme Court has gone even further and has held that
the right to counsel can be triggered even before one finds himself in a police sta-
tion. See Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 326-27 (1969) (finding that police interro-
gation of a suspect in his own bed, thus in familiar surroundings, violated, amongst
other rights, the right to have counsel); see also Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 19
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting) (asserting that the above Supreme
Court decisions have broadened the right to assistance of counsel) (citing Orozco v.
Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969); Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968); Gilbert v.
California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Mi-
randa v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)). Justice Harlan disagrees with the extension
of the right to counsel to pre-indictment events. See id.
142 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
143 See THE BRETHREN, supra note 15, at 76-77.
144 See id. at 77 ("Where is there anything in the Constitution that says that al-
though a man has the right at the time of prosecution, he cannot claim that help the
first time he needs counsel?") (quoting a memo regarding the Coleman case sent by
Justice Black to Chief Justice Burger before the Court rendered its decision).
15 See Coleman, 399 U.S. at 7 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69)
(1932) ("[A] person accused of [a] crime 'requires the guiding hand of counsel at
every step in the proceedings against him.' ").
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cedures set forth in the United States Attorneys' Manual for de-
termining whether the death penalty is to be sought.'46 The pri-
mary purpose of the preliminary hearing in Coleman was "to de-
termine whether there [was] sufficient evidence against the
accused to warrant" seeking an indictment.4 7 The primary pur-
pose of the Department of Justice protocol is to determine if
there is sufficient evidence of aggravating factors to warrant
seeking the death penalty.' Under the Department of Justice
protocol, the potential capital defendant is given the opportunity
to present evidence, but is not required to do so.' 49 In Coleman,
the mere fact that the defendant was not required to enter any
arguments at the preliminary hearing did not bar it from being
deemed a critical stage. 5'
B. Effective Assistance of Counsel: The Erroneous Application of
the Strickland Test
The defendant's right to counsel requires more than simply
allowing the defendant to have an attorney by his or her side.
Counsel must be effective in order for the constitutional require-
ment to be met.'5' This aspect of the right to counsel must be
guarded with special care in capital cases, where defendants are
typically indigent and, therefore, would have difficulty retaining
qualified counsel.'52 A defendant compelled to accept appointed
counsel is disadvantaged from the start due to a shortage of
qualified legal counsel willing to take on court-appointments,
and a shortage of funds to pay for such counsel.' This makes it
'4 See supra notes 24-31 and accompanying text (discussing defendants' oppor-
tunit to present evidence at this pre-trial stage).
Coleman, 399 U.S. at 8.
'48 For a description of the authorization process, see supra Part I.A.
19 See supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text (giving defendant's counsel the
opportunity to present mitigating factors).
10 See Coleman, 399 U.S. at 8 (" At the preliminary hearing.., the accused is
not required to advance any defenses....'" (quoting Coleman v. State, 211 So. 2d
917, 921 (Ala. Ct. App. 1968))) (alterations in original).
51 See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 58 (1932) (holding defendants were not
granted the right of counsel when counsel rushed to trial without proper prior in-
vestigation).
" 2 See Interview with Judge Emmet R. Cox, Chair of the Judicial Conference
Defender Services Committee, April 1997 (stating that approximately 85% of all
federal criminal defendants will be unable at some point during the proceedings to
pay a lawyer).
'0 See id- (stating that a large number of death penalty inmates do not have
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more difficult for the indigent defendant to "effectively...
counter the prosecution's natural advantage.""M In Furman, the
Court noted that the ability to hire one's own attorney often
plays a significant part in determining whether the defendant
will ultimately be sentenced to death.'55 The Sixth Amendment
makes an attempt to remedy the imbalance of power between de-
fendant and prosecution by "furnish[ing] the individual with the
pertinent tools with which to defend against the organized power
of the state." 56 Allowing a defendant to have an attorney pres-
ent, without permitting counsel the discovery necessary for ef-
fective representation of the client, is constitutionally insuffi-
cient.
The Boyd court, relying on Strickland v. Washington,1 57 ruled
that the denial of discovery did not impair counsel's effective-
ness." The Strickland test, however, is inapplicable in cases
like Boyd. In Strickland, the Supreme Court set forth a "highly
demanding," two-prong test for determining whether a conviction
should be overturned based on a defendant's claim of ineffective
counsel. 59 The defendant in Boyd, however, was not seeking to
reverse a conviction; he was attempting to secure his right to
counsel in the first instance.' 6 Under Strickland, the defendant
counsel, and that costs of representation are rising as the number of death penalty
cases grows).
154 GARCIA, supra note 128, at 9 (" 'Resource deprivation' hampers defense at-
torneys who represent indigent clients. Their ability effectively to counter the prose-
cution's natural advantage is impaired by a combination of excessive workloads, lack
of adequate funds for investigation and expert witnesses, and nominal support
staff.") (footnote omitted).
155 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 251-52 (1972) (per curiam) (Douglas,
J., concurring) ("One searches our chronicles in vain for the execution of any mem-
ber of the affluent strata of this society. The Leopolds and Loebs are given prison
terms, not sentenced to death.").
'5 GARCIA, supra note 128, at 1; see also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,
344 (1963) (requiring appointment of counsel for indigent defendants in order to en-
sure a fair trial); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938) (holding that the typi-
cal defendant suffers a marked disadvantage against the prosecution because court
proceedings are often, to the layman, "intricate, complex and mysterious").
157 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
'5 See United States v. Boyd, 931 F. Supp. 968, 971-73 (D.R.I. 1996) (finding
that the government's interference with discovery did not hamper effective assis-
tance of counsel).
"9 Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 382 (1986).
'60 See Boyd, 931 F. Supp. at 969 n.1 (filing motion to seek effective assistance of
counsel).
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must prove that "counsel's performance was deficient and that
the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.... [Gireat
deference [is] accorded to counsel's performance."'6' It is inap-
propriate to apply this standard when the focus is not the in-
competence of counsel, but rather the interference of the judicial
system with counsel's ability to act effectively. Governmental in-
terference with a fundamental right of due process, such as the
right to counsel,'62 is to be strictly scrutinized."
V. CONCLUSION
Justice and the Constitution require that the rights of capi-
tal defendants be carefully guarded-to prevent racism, clas-
sism, and the inherent flaws of a man-made system from skew-
ing the fair application of the law. The punishment of death is
"unique and irreversible."' Its severity warrants the utmost
care beginning at the earliest point in the criminal proceeding.
By denying capital defendants early discovery, the courts are de-
nying them one of the most fundamental rights of due process,
the right to effective counsel. This nation's history of imposing
capital punishment at the state level is steeped in bias and mis-
take. That the federal courts now risk traversing the same
crooked road is reflected in the recent decisions of the districts of
Rhode Island and Connecticut.
Stefanie Lindeman
161 GARCIA, supra note 128, at 33.
162 See id. at 24-25 (discussing the dueling interests of: government's goal to
eliminate crime and the defendant's right to counsel).
16 See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942), superseded by Bouijaily
v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987) ("The right to have the assistance of counsel is
too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the
amount of prejudice arising from its denial.").
" Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,287 (1976).
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